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ABSTRACT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) served as a paradigm shift
to reimburse physicians based on health outcomes or quality of care patients receive in
relation to and conscious of the cost to provide care, rather than the traditional fee-forservice (FFS) system. To implement value-based care under the ACA, value-based care
models (VBCM), such as patient-centered medical homes (PCMH) and accountable care
organizations (ACO), were formed with the ultimate goal to advance quality of care.
Among commercially insured populations, clinically integrated networks (CIN) have
emerged as another type of VBCM.
Since CINs are the newest type of VBCM, the current literature explains their
formation and intended goals, yet no studies examine a CIN’s ability to improve quality.
This dissertation fills that knowledge gap by examining a large and advanced CIN in the
Midwestern US to evaluate the effect the CIN’s formation has on the improvement of the
quality of care. In particular, this study focuses on evaluating whether a physician
becoming a participating member of the CIN improves performance outcomes in
readmissions and cardiovascular disease (CVD).
I developed a framework using Donabedian theory to explain why a change in
structure through physicians becoming members of the CIN may have an effect on
process and outcome quality metrics. To empirically investigate the framework, this
dissertation uses a retrospective, longitudinal study design. To estimate the effect of a
physician becoming a participating member of the CIN on quality improvement in
vi

readmissions and CVD, a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) empirical strategy is
deployed. Using the CINs own data collection and analytics platform, quality metrics
were collected across approximately 3.1 million patients and 180 million patient
encounters from 2016-2018.
There was no observed effect between the formation of the CIN and the quality of
care delivered. This was explained in the data by the near optimal performance of
participating physicians within the CIN. For example, the national average for 30-day
readmissions is approximately 20%; yet, the CINs average is around 2.2%. These
findings suggest that a strategy targeted directly toward physicians within the CIN could
more clearly enhance quality outcomes; implementing a strategy that disseminates these
quality metrics to each individual physician is the logical next step for quality
improvement. Taking the additional step to unblind these results allows physicians to see
their own performance and how they compare to their peers. This holds the potential for
an even greater effect on quality outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND: A GROWING NEED FOR VALUE-BASED CARE
In 2007, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) began recruitment efforts
for participation in a groundbreaking collaboration of what eventually became known as
the Triple Aim. In total, 141 participating organizations around the world took part
including hospitals, health care systems, insurance companies, social service groups,
community coalitions and public health agencies. By 2008, the Triple Aim was
announced as the solution to simultaneously improve individual experience of care,
improve health of populations and reduce per capita costs of care. This solution was
necessary because most of the major global health systems lacked the capacity to
integrate cost-conscious and high-quality health care across multiple sites over time. 1,2
For the United States, the Triple Aim initiative could not have been introduced at
a more pertinent time. During the early 2000’s, the Commonwealth Fund Commission
on a High Performance Health System released their report stating weaknesses of the US
health care system.3 The Commission gave an overall score of 66 percent, with 100
percent referring to the top decile of known measured performance. Furthermore, they
noted that even though US health care expenditures continue to rise and are exceptionally
higher than similarly developed countries, the results regarding quality outcomes are far
worse. In fact, health care spending in the US is nearly double that of the next most
costly nation, yet the US ranks thirty-first among nations on life expectancy, thirty-sixth
1

on infant mortality, twenty-eighth on male healthy life expectancy and twenty-ninth on
female healthy life expectancy. 4 Similar studies found despite the US ranking highest in
the world regarding healthcare spending, the US ranks lowest on health performance and
outcome indicators among eleven comparable nations.5,6
The need for value is clear; as a nation the US has successfully built the most
expensive health care system in the world without necessarily achieving the best
outcomes. The US was well justified in using the Triple Aim as a guidepost for the
trajectory of the health care reform efforts. 7 In 2010, the Triple Aim officially became
part of the US national strategy for solving health care deficiencies through the passage
and implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Traditionally, the US health care system has depended on fee-for-service (FFS)
compensation, where physicians are reimbursed retrospectively for each service
completed based on billed charges or annual fee schedules, regardless of cost or quality
outcomes. The traditional FFS reimbursement model results in physicians being
incentivized to order more tests and procedures,8 which, in turn, increases health care
spending but does not necessarily directly contribute to improving patient outcomes.9
Furthermore, the FFS model challenges care coordination, as physicians see more
patients than their workflow allows.8 As a concept, FFS promotes quantity over quality,
creating a siloed and fragmented system.
The ACA forced a paradigm shift to instead begin paying for value, defined as the
health outcomes or quality care the patient receives in relation to and conscious of the
cost to provide care.9,10 Value-based care reimbursement ties payments for care delivery
directly to the quality of care provided and rewards physicians for both efficient and
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effective practices. To pay for performance, physicians must report selected quality
metrics and demonstrate improvement over time. Under this new model of health care
delivery, physicians are expected and incentivized to improve performance by using: 1) a
team approach, 2) evidence-based medicine, 3) patient engagement, 4) upgraded health
technology, and 5) advanced data analytics. Physicians receive financial rewards only
when patients are provided with coordinated care that is both effective and
appropriate.11,12
To implement value-based care under the ACA, the federal government was the
first to design value-based care models (VBCM) with the ultimate goal to advance
quality of care while increasing patient access and accounting for price at the point of
service. Medicare is a good starting point to advance health care quality as this
population is large and extremely costly to the US health system. Reflecting this shift, in
2015, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced their goal to have
85 percent of all Medicare FFS payments tied to quality or value by 2016, and 90 percent
by 2018. Furthermore, they set a target of 30 percent of Medicare payments tied to
quality or value are to come via VBCMs by the end of 2016, and 50 percent of payments
through VBCMs by the end of 2018. 13,14
Patient-centered medical homes (PCMH) are a type of VBCM that have gained in
popularity; the ACA included federal PCMH demonstration programs that have since
expanded to a variety of private settings across the country.15 PCMHs host a myriad of
primary care improvements including the assignment of patients to a personalized
primary care physician responsible for directing “whole person” care.16 In general,
medical homes encourage primary care practices to invest in state-of-the-art electronic
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medical records (EMR), enhanced access options, team-based medicine approaches,
population health management, personal care management and consistent quality care
results in exchange for enhanced payments, usually seen as per-patient-per-month fees
for comprehensive services.17,18
Accountable care organizations (ACO) are another VBCM based on primary care
and were originally designed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
to provide Medicare beneficiaries with high quality health care and have been deemed the
most promising approach to address care fragmentation, poor quality outcomes and
achieve the Triple Aim.19 There are now more than 700 ACOs that participate in a CMS
payment program such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), Advanced
Payment ACO Model or the Pioneer ACO Model. Within an ACO, physicians, hospitals
and other health care clinicians work as a networked team to deliver the best possible
coordinated care at the lowest possible cost. Under the payment structure, the ACO
shares savings if it is able to deliver high quality care at reduced costs but also goes at
risk to lose money if it underperforms.20
Lastly, clinically integrated networks (CIN) consist of a network of otherwise
independent physicians and hospitals who collectively commit to the cost and quality
improvements under which the ACA is based. Members of the CIN are able to negotiate
directly and take on risk for the cost of medical claims with employers for commercial
payer contracts under safe harbor antitrust law. CINs are multi-specialty based compared
to the primary care foundation of PCMHs and ACOs. They are physician led
organizations that abide by a set of performance and outcome metrics (both inpatient and
outpatient in nature) and have a robust data system to monitor physician performance
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against these goals. Membership is selective and limited only to physicians who can
maintain and advance the CIN quality metrics with the lowest possible cost to the
employer partner. VBCMs such as PCMHs, ACOs and CINs are all examples of models
that have come forth in response to the Triple Aim; however, the success of these models
in lowering health care costs and improving health care quality is still to be determined.2123

1.2 CLINICALLY INTEGRATED NETWORKS: A BETTER APPROACH?
The current body of research on VBCMs is primarily focused on the taxonomy,
formation and implementation of these models. While recent literature evaluates the
effect of VBCMs ability to lower health care costs, the evidence regarding the models’
impact on quality outcomes still remains scarce and with mixed results. For instance,
while the PCMH has shown promising results as a means for reorganizing health care
systems and improving care continuity and chronic disease management, systematic
reviews evaluating PCMH quality outcomes are inconclusive and often produce
conflicting results. 24-27 Various studies have shown improvements in physician
experience, patient satisfaction, improved practice-level quality metrics, better preventive
health, higher levels of disease management and a reduction in emergency department
(ED) visits.15,28-30 However, other studies presented mixed results such as a Pennsylvania
PCMH showing performance improvement on only 1 out of 11 quality measures.31 Other
systematic reviews of PCMHs suggest that although PCMHs were associated with
reduction in specialty visits and cancer screenings they were not associated with the
majority of outcomes studied including primary care, inpatient hospitalization and
emergency department visits across multiple metrics.31-33 On the opposite end of the
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spectrum, one study observed not a single impact on quality improvement metrics from 9
separate PCMH pilots studied.34
Likewise, ACO quality results vary. Many studies mirror CMS’ general
conclusion that ACOs have succeeded in most quality metrics, with the greatest
improvements in heart failure, surgery outcomes, depression screening, blood pressure,
pneumonia vaccinations and fall risks.19,35-38 Conversely, several studies showed mixed
results. For example, while preventable hospitalizations for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, asthma and diabetes decreased, congestive heart failure
hospitalizations and 30-day readmissions increased.39,40 In addition, studies found ACOs
to actually hinder areas of quality improvement such as: adverse perioperative outcomes,
emergency department and inpatient readmissions, a decline in prostate cancer treatments
and no discernable decrease in post-operative morbidity, mortality and readmissions.41-45
In terms of cost, PCMHs and ACOs have proven their ability to control costs
because cost is easy to measure, and data is readily available. Overall success though,
lies in both cost containment and quality improvement. Quality improvement poses
challenges; quality is difficult to define and measure, which makes data difficult to
obtain. Literature on PCMHs cite methodological concerns regarding quality outcomes
due to the vague nature under which PCMHs are formed and organized. Six practice
improvement categories are set forth via guidelines form the National Committee for
Quality Assurance, but the guidelines poorly lay out how to define, measure and collect
quality outcomes data.46 Similarly, ACOs have struggled with the inability to produce
the quality arm of the Triple Aim. Although the taxonomy of ACOs is better defined
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than in a PCMH, care coordination and the ability to capture and report quality metrics is
still proving difficult.47
To control costs in the CIN model, the CIN guarantees either a reduction in
overall spend or a reduction in spending growth and takes on risk for any amount over the
guarantee. If the CIN spends less than the cost guarantee, savings are shared between the
CIN and the employer. Where the CIN model takes cost one step further than other
VBCMs is their commitment to quality; a CIN must meet or exceed quality metrics
before it can qualify for the risk sharing payout. Given the legal requirements,
organizational structure and commercial patient population, the CIN may be more
conducive for studying its effect on quality compared to other VBCMs. This is because
the CIN has: 1) a stable, employed patient population, 2) quality measures are formed and
defined by member physicians, 3) quality metrics are rigorously tracked on a monthly
basis, 4) a formation and organizational structure bound by legal standards, 5) a more
advanced risk and incentive structure and 6) incentives are tied to guaranteed patient
populations through employer contracts with the CIN.21-23
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES
CINs are the newest type of VBCM to enter the market; the current literature
explains their formation and intended goals. However, based on extensive literature
searches, no studies examine the ability of a CIN to improve quality outcomes. This
dissertation aims to fill this knowledge gap by examining a large and advanced CIN in
the Midwestern US to evaluate the effect the CINs formation has on the improvement of
medical care provided. In particular, this study is focused on evaluating whether a
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physician becoming a participating member of the CIN improves their performance as
measured by quality metric outcomes.
To begin, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the CIN model including legal
structure, clinical integration strategy and data infrastructure along with explanation on
how CINs lower health care costs and improve health care quality outcomes within the
commercial payer market. Next, a case study is presented for a specific CIN, whose
impact on quality is evaluated in Chapters 3 and 4. A brief history of this CIN is
provided along with specific details, concluding with an example demonstrating the early
success of this particular CIN in containing costs for a particular employer, the
Springfield Missouri School District. In Chapters 3 and 4, this dissertation evaluates
whether a physician becoming a participating member of this CIN improves quality
metrics in the areas of readmissions and cardiovascular disease (CVD). Chapters 3 and 4
utilize this CIN’s own unique, longitudinal dataset of quality metrics (both process and
outcome) collected for approximately 3 million patients (180 million patient encounters)
from 2016 to 2018.
Chapter 3 evaluates whether a physician (emergency medicine, hospital medicine
and internal medicine) becoming a participating member of the CIN improves quality
outcomes in emergency department and inpatient readmissions. Readmissions were
chosen for this dissertation as they are associated with both high utilization and high cost.
Furthermore, readmission costs to employers are higher amongst the private sector due to
higher payment rates. Secondly, hospitals and physicians need assistance in tracking
their performance with respect to readmissions, because 20 to 40% of patients are “lost”
in the system, as these patients were readmitted to a hospital or health system outside of

8

the original admitting entity.48 Only a model such as a CIN or large government agency,
like CMS, has the ability to track patients across physicians and systems via EMR
integration. Lastly, preventable readmissions are commonly associated with indicators of
substandard care during the initial hospitalization such as poor resolution of the main
diagnosis, unstable therapy at discharge and inadequate post discharge care; all these
factors are controlled by health care physicians and organizations and thus hold merit to
be studied.49
Chapter 4 evaluates whether a physician (cardiothoracic surgeon or cardiologist)
becoming a participating member of the CIN improves quality outcomes in CVD. CVD
was chosen for three reasons, 1) it is highly prevalent in the working population, 2) is
extremely costly to employers and 3) the CVD community has established guidelines and
protocols leading to the evaluation of CVD outcomes.9 This proposal provides a
comprehensive study of CVD through utilizing process metrics to determine the effect of
a physician becoming a participating member of the CIN has on CVD.

9

CHAPTER 2
CLINICALLY INTEGRATED NETWORKS: A CASE STUDY
2.1 A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE
Health care spending in the US is becoming more costly with each passing year;
Medicare and Medicaid account for one of the largest segments of the federal budget,
commercial premiums continue to rise and consumers are plagued with high copayments
and deductibles.50 Most industry leaders believe fee-for-service (FFS) to be the culprit of
this continued growth, which incentivizes quantity over quality, regardless of the cost.8,51
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 has since shifted
physician payments to quality or value over quantity via the use of value-based care
models (VBCMs), which tie payments directly to the quality of care provided and
rewards physicians for both efficient and effective practices. The two most prevalent
types of VBCMs are patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) and accountable care
organizations (ACOs). Both were initially introduced by the federal government and
have seen promising early results in cost savings but have shown mixed results in quality
improvement.24,30,35,40 The vast majority of VBCM literature focuses on Medicare
beneficiaries and does not address costs or quality for the 150 million people who are part
of the US workforce and use commercial health insurance carriers.52
While the federal government was the first to move toward value, commercial
health insurance carriers have slowly adopted the VBCM approach. Large carriers have
implemented small-scale commercial PCMH and ACO models, but the majority of
10

contracts reside under the FFS approach. This may be due to a myriad of barriers
including: 1) the lack of updated information technology infrastructure, including
multiple claims systems unable to communicate with one another, 2) no easy means of
incorporating shared-savings payments into self-insured contracts, and 3) employers have
not demanded insurance carriers to move toward value. To date, employers have focused
on altering their benefit plan designs to control cost and improve quality, since directly
influencing the delivery of care itself is more complex. These changes, such as wellness
programs and decreased premiums that act as incentives for employees to improve their
health behaviors, have only shown modest results in controlling costs and improving
quality.53 While employers have been slow to adopt VBCM approaches, they are
beginning to focus on supply-side mechanisms to improve cost and quality in health care.
The National Business Group on Health found that almost 25% of self-insured employers
are planning to direct their payments toward a VBCM by 2018 and it is expected to
double over the next two years.50
One of the first major efforts on behalf of employers was in early 2016 when forty
companies, among them American Express, Verizon, Johnson and Johnson and Macy’s,
formed the Health Transformation Alliance (HTA) aimed at lowering the companies’
health care spending. However, thus far the HTA has only used this bargaining power in
the pharmacy landscape through negotiations with two major pharmacy benefit managers
(OptumRx and CVS Caremark) to receive consistent pricing on branded drugs. The
alliance did announce contract negotiations with Cigna and United Health for medical
benefits in 2017, but this partnership was limited to patients with diabetes or those
undergoing hip and knee replacements and in the geographic areas of Phoenix, Chicago
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and Dallas-Fort Worth.54 The HTA has yet to provide any updates regarding medical
care cost and quality improvement results.50 Recently, an initiative announced by
Amazon, JP Morgan and Berkshire Hathaway has again heralded a new wave of
employer activism in the health benefits arena but is too new to gauge what outcomes
may persist.50,55 While commercial health plans and employers still remain somewhat
stuck in the FFS system, a new type of VBCM, the clinically integrated network (CIN)
may be a viable solution to curb costs and improve quality within this sector.
2.2 WHAT IS A CLINICALLY INTEGRATED NETWORK?
A CIN is a legal structure that facilitates physician collaboration in pursuit of cost
containment and quality improvement. A CIN should not be confused with the loosely
defined term “clinical integration,” which has been a popular buzzword in the health care
industry over the last decade since the passage of the ACA. By definition, a CIN can
describe everything from vague collaboration among physician rivals to mergers that
bring hospitals and physicians under single ownership. 56 The CIN model is similar to an
ACO or PCMH but ups the ante in a number of ways.1
First, the CIN is a legal entity and must meet the guidelines set forth by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ); whereas,
commercial PCMHs and ACOs can be involved in contracts without meeting the legal
mandate.2 A CIN applies the concept of ‘clinical integration’ by joining a network of
otherwise independent physicians to form a legal entity under “safe harbor” from antitrust
laws accepted by the FTC and DOJ. The CIN then forms commercial payer contracts

Hospitals or health systems can simultaneously be any combination of PCMH, ACO and
CIN
2
Non-commercial PMCHs and ACOs are subject to CMS regulations
1
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with employers (removing the traditional insurance carrier) where employees/patients
receive care from the network of physicians within the CIN. In essence, to qualify as a
CIN pursuant to the legal definition, the following conditions must exist: 1) a network of
physicians must be clinically integrated by demonstrating “a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation” through 2) a program of initiatives designed to
“control costs and ensure quality,” which 3) is supported by an “infrastructure” that
allows the physicians to “evaluate and modify practice patterns.”57-59
The second differentiator between a CIN and other VBCMs is that a CIN is
physician-centric, while an ACO is hospital-centric. To comply with antitrust laws, a
CIN can consist of multiple entities (hospitals, independent physician practices, health
systems, etc.) but it must have physician-leadership at the center of its governance model,
which is not required for other VBCMs.8,22,51,57,59,60 Recall the first component from the
FTC guidelines is for the CIN to be clinically integrated through interdependence and
cooperation. Since a CIN contracts directly with employers, part of its value lies in
having a robust network of physicians (across specialties and geographic regions) who
are able to provide necessary services to its patient population. If there are notable gaps
in the network, the CIN is a less attractive solution for employers. Therefore, the
majority of CINs are centered around major hospitals or health systems, typically referred
to as sponsors, who employ an array of physician specialties. However, rarely is even a
predominantly physician-employed CIN robust enough to be able to negotiate an
employer contract without supplementing services to round out its network.61
Figure 2.1 presents different possibilities for the clinical integration of physicians
within a CIN. An ideal CIN appears at the center, where complete integration is
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represented by 100% of physicians being employed within the CIN network. When
physicians are employed within the network, the CIN has complete control over the cost,
quality, EMR, data, etc. of all physicians. Moving out from the center, the clinical
integration structure of the CIN becomes less binding and therefore less desirable. For
example, the first ring (CIN at-risk) depicts physicians who are not employed within the
CIN but are at risk for their own portion of the overall cost of care. These physicians
must still provide quality metrics to the CIN and are essentially carved out of the network
but still reap the benefits of greater market share through employer contracts. If these
physicians meet the quality and cost goals, they receive some form of dividend or profit
sharing from the CIN. The next ring (CIN with incentives) illustrates non-employed
physicians who supply quality data and have some ability to capitalize in upside risk but
do not have downside risk; if they meet the quality and cost standards, they receive the
additional volume from theses risk-based employer contracts but no bonus or incentive
payment. The subsequent ring (CIN fee-for-service) represents non-employed physicians
who are committed to supplying data for the purpose of quality and best practice but are
not financially aligned; there is no cost sharing, as these physicians are paid on a FFS
basis. The last ring (contracted, non-CIN and no data) are physicians who are not
cooperative to the network as they do not provide quality data or participate in any sort of
risk-sharing for cost.62 It is the clinical integration structure (shown in Figure 2.1) that
provides a third differentiator between a CIN and other VBCMs. A CIN must fully meet
FTC standards when hospitals or health systems collaborate with independent physicians
or physician groups that involve incentives. A commercial ACO can use their own
employed physicians and be outside the scope of a CIN, as long as the physicians are
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being paid FFS. However, if independent physicians begin to receive incentives for
performance from the ACO, the ACO would then need to meet the FTC standards.

Figure 2.1 Dante’s Rings Diagram Representing Clinical Integration in a CIN
2.3 CINS: LOWERING HELTH CARE COSTS AND IMPROVING QUALITY
Cost containment is a vital component of any VBCM and is included in the FTC
as a mandatory condition for CINs. To date, ACOs have shown some success in cost
savings for the Medicare population.36,39,40,45 However, the private sector has yet to make
similar progress. Therefore, the vast majority of PCMHs and ACOs across the country
cover Medicare beneficiaries (where success in cost containment has been proven)3
whereas a CIN covers a commercial/employed population.63
There is no one way for a CIN to lower health care costs in their contracts; the
only necessary element is that of risk. In the traditional benefits landscape, the insurance
carrier (and any brokers involved) acts as a third-party payer between the

This may be due to the fact that non-commercial ACOs (those in a contract with CMS)
have generated greater savings than commercial ACOs and therefore have been slower to
adopt.

3
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employer/employees/patients and the physician/health system; the insurance carrier
accepts the risk (cost) of medical claims. The CIN model greatly diminishes the role of
the insurance carrier in this equation and instead contracts directly with the self-insured
employer; thereby accepting the risk (cost) associated with medical claims4 64
CINs can leverage a broad range of cost containment methods but at its simplest
form there are usually two basic approaches: price and utilization. For a CIN to lower
cost based on price, the CIN must simply be the lowest cost provider. Some CINs have
achieved this end by providing prices based on a menu-type basis where discounts are
given per individual diagnosis-related group (DRG). Other CINs have focused on
lowering pharmaceutical prices, as employers’ pharmacy costs are approaching thirty
percent of insurance premiums.61 To leverage cost through utilization, a CIN strives to
be the highest quality provider of care while achieving the appropriate volume. The
Mayo Clinic, for example, is known for being a high-cost health care provider. However,
their business model is such that in their highly specialized surgery department alone,
enough appropriate testing is done up front that 30% of all these specialized surgery
patients in fact do not need a procedure and are treated with cheaper alternatives. This
due diligence allows them to reduce overall utilization and ultimately drives down cost.
64,65

Similar to cost, ensuring high-quality outcomes is paramount to VBCMs and is
also a requirement in the FTC guidelines. Thus far, both PCMHs and ACOs have shown
mixed results in quality improvement, therefore postulating the CIN as a potentially

4

CINs must have reinsurance (which keeps them from needing an insurance license) in
the case of any substantially high medical claims as a form of stop-loss.
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better solution.17,27,28,30,38-40,42,66 The quality improvement component is where the CIN
model truly differentiates itself from the other VBCMs. First, the PCMH and ACO
models are centered around primary care and therefore the vast majority of quality
metrics are attributed to the primary care specialty; whereas in a CIN, all specialties
across the CIN must have quality metrics applicable to each specialty; primary care
metrics cannot be blindly applied to a cardiologist, for example. 67 Secondly, since a CIN
is required to be physician-led, it is physicians who choose the quality metrics. Unlike
non-commercial ACOs, whose quality metrics are provided to them solely from CMS.
Third, PCMHs and ACOs include metrics on physician and patient satisfaction, a CIN
does not include such metrics. CINs focus exclusively on physician performance through
process or outcome measures, as the FTC standards are to “ensure quality”, not to ensure
satisfaction.
This segues to another distinction: the quality standard in a CIN is higher than in
other VBCMs. The third condition under the FTC guidelines is that physicians are to be
“evaluated and modified”. Therefore, if physicians do not meet the minimum thresholds
for their applicable quality measures, they must be removed from the CIN network,
whereas, in a PCMH or ACO removal is not a requirement.58,59,68 Furthermore, within
the contract between the CIN and an employer, cost savings cannot be deemed a success
without fully achieving quality guarantees. A CIN cannot simply forsake quality as a
means to lower costs. Only when quality metrics are met can shared savings between the
CIN and the employer transpire.68
Lastly, in order to achieve a high-quality network (with the ability to evaluate and
modify physician practices), the CIN must be supported by the infrastructure condition
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issued by the FTC. Therefore, advanced EMRs and data systems must be put in place for
data to be shared with members across the network so performance monitoring and
evaluation can ensue.51,57,58 The data from the CIN serves three purposes. First, since
data can be collected at both the patient and physician level, it allows the CIN to
accurately evaluate individual physician performance and determine whether or not a
modification approach is needed to yield better quality outcomes including removal of
physicians from the network, if necessary. Second, it provides greater detail into specific
quality metrics to take on further risk with employers. For example, if an employer is
particularly concerned about cancer screenings, they can ask the CIN to take on greater
risk (cost responsibility) for these specific metrics. This holds the CIN to an even greater
quality responsibility in a particular area for the employer to cater to their own
beneficiaries. Third, it provides the CIN data to present to the market as being a highperforming network.69
2.4 THE CIN: A HARD SELL BUT A GOOD BET
Employers have it hard; they are drowning in high dollar medical claims.
Likewise, physicians and health systems are struggling as they see continued decreasing
reimbursement. In theory, CINs can create a symbiotic relationship between
physicians/health systems and employers/patients as they allow for shared accountability
for quality improvement, provide a legal structure for combining multiple entities and
have the potential to deliver a coordinated care model. Furthermore, CINs offer the “halo
effect”, which posits that all patients, not just those in CIN at-risk contacts, will benefit
from better care coordination. However, to date, there is no literature rigorously
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assessing the CIN models’ ability to lower health care costs and improve quality
outcomes.
CIN research (usually from consulting firms) has primarily focused on their
taxonomy, formation and cost benefits to member health systems. While this research is
important, these cost-benefit questions have already been answered for VBCMs in
general, regardless of the specific model (PCMH, ACO or CIN). It is easy and
straightforward for CINs, along with other VBCMs, to prove their worth in cost
containment but we have yet to see any results in utilization and quality.60
2.5 MPACT HEALTH: AN OVERVIEW
To generate evidence of a CINs impact on cost and quality, this dissertation
focuses on a large, advanced CIN located in the Midwestern US called MPact Health
(MPact). There were multiple drivers of change in the health care industry that led
MPact to form: high health care and insurance costs, inconsistent quality of care, lack of
value-added services and employers searching for better options. Physicians in the
region voiced the desire to practice high quality medicine while receiving reasonable
compensation and having minimal administration interruptions to their workflow. These
factors spurred physicians, health systems and employers in this region to find solutions
via the CIN model.59
In 2013, the former Vice-Chancellor of the medical school at the University of
Missouri Health System (MU Health), located in Columbia, Missouri, saw the healthcare
market moving in a different direction across the state and region; moving away from
FFS and toward value. While he wanted MU Health to be a part of this paradigm shift,
rewiring an academic medical center away from quantity and toward quality is a hard
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battle; he knew partners were needed for this lofty endeavor. At the time, Mosaic Life
Care (Mosaic), located in St. Joseph, Missouri was the number two performing ACO in
quality in the country. Likewise, Mercy Health (Mercy), headquartered in St. Louis, MO
and spanning across multiple regions in the Midwest, was the number ten performing
ACO in quality in the country. The first meeting between the three entities was in the
spring of 2015, with the initial focus being to share best practices with one another. Soon
after, it was decided to take this collaboration one step further by formally forming a CIN
(MPact), which was fully functioning by the end of the same year.70 Figure 2.2 depicts
the geographic distribution of hospitals (blue dots) and clinics (grey dots) that exist
within MPact’s physician network.

Figure 2.2 Geographic Distribution of MPact’s Physician Network
MPact was initially represented by the Chicago-based Hogan Marren law firm,
who also successfully represented the first CIN, Advocate Health. MPact’s legal team
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cite that a proper analysis of any physician-led network’s clinical integration program
must pass a three-part test. First, whether the network’s clinical integration program is
“real”; meaning that authentic initiatives are actually undertaken by the CIN which
involve all physicians in the network and apply to the physicians’ practice patterns
relative to patients who obtain health benefits. Second, the initiatives of the program are
designed to achieve likely improvements in health care quality and efficiency. And third,
whether joint contracts with FFS health plans are “reasonably necessary” to achieve the
efficiencies of the clinical integration program. This means that adding a physician based
in New York to the network even though the employer contract is in Missouri would be
deemed not reasonably necessary.57,62
Table 2.1 MPact Chapters and Sponsoring Entities
Chapter Number

Chapter Name

Sponsoring Entity

1

Western Arkansas

Mercy

2

Central Missouri

MU

3

St. Louis

Mercy

4

MO-KAN

Mercy

5

Springfield

Mercy

6

NW Arkansas

Mercy

7

Oklahoma

Mercy

8

NW Missouri

Mosaic

9

SE Missouri

St. Francis Healthcare
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Figure 2.3 Geographic Distribution of MPact’s Physician Network by Chapter
MPact is a multi-state5 CIN that meets the FTC and DOJ definition of clinical
integration with a business model of single-signature, value-based contracting direct to
employers. Table 2.1 presents the chapter numbers with the corresponding chapter name
and sponsoring entity; Figure 2.3 depicts these chapters geographically.
2.6 THE CLINICAL INTEGRATION OF MPACT
The vast majority of physicians in the MPact network are employed by the three
sponsors, therefore almost achieving complete clinical integration.6 Of the 4,000
physicians in the network; 3,600 are employed and 400 (10%) are independent; these
independent physicians are not involved in any risk-taking contracts, they are on a FFS

MPact Health spans across 5-states in the Midwest including Missouri, Arkansas,
Kansas, Oklahoma and Illinois
6
Refer to Figure 2.1
5
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setup, but do submit quality data. Altogether, MPact has 31 specialties in its network and
quality database they feel make up 99% of the volume of health care demanded but may
not cover 99% of health care costs. Any services the MPact network cannot provide,
such as transplants or burn care, are carved out of the network and the employer assumes
the costs and quality associated with those services.62
Recall that CINs prefer to have complete clinical integration through employed
physicians; however, this is difficult to achieve as even Mercy (the largest health system
within MPact), does not employ all physician specialties. Therefore, MPact, acting as the
CIN, provides Mercy the legal structure to round-out their network with independent
physician practices that keeps them above reproach.
2.7 THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MPACT
MPact’s daily operations are managed by a Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Operations Officer along with analysts. Just as the FTC guidelines stipulate, MPact is a
physician-led entity and is structured as such. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the organizational
structure of MPact.

Figure 2.4 Organizational Structure of MPact
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The MPact Health Board is comprised of physicians and executives from the three
sponsoring entities who set the strategy for MPact and dictate which physicians may join
the CIN. The MPact Health Alliance consists of physicians who serve as chairs of their
respective chapters and are deemed best practice implementers. The Alliance focuses
their efforts on streamlining high volume and high variance practice patterns across the
network. For example, this group streamlined processes and vendor contracts after data
had shown a high volume of knee surgeries across the network but at greatly different
cost points. Figure 2.5 takes a closer look at the physician-led CIN board, which serves
as the operational arm of MPact.70

Figure 2.5 Organizational Structure of MPact CIN Board
This board decides which employers or government entities to establish at-risk
contracts with, along with having the responsibility of managing the operations
committees: quality, information technology (IT), insurance and care management.
Committees include physicians across the network and members from the CIN board to
24

maintain continuity.70 The quality improvement committee is responsible for choosing
the quality metrics and maintaining up-to-date definitions and criteria for all metrics.
This group also establishes the goals and minimum thresholds (percentages) for each
measure along with tracking the performance on these measures for all physicians. The
IT committee serves as the main contact for Optum, MPact’s data platform, and decides
on any updates and modifications. The insurance strategy committee oversees the live
contracts with any employers and government agencies and is responsible for any
contractual modifications and future contractual updates. The care management
committee focuses on dispersing effective care management programs back to the
network as a whole. For example, this committee would create and/or disseminate to the
network any best practices that come forth either internally (physicians in the network) or
externally (national/association recommendations) 70
The MPact chapter committees serve as the operational units on the ground and
are involved in-depth with the physicians in each chapter. Their main responsibility is to
ensure quality on behalf of all participating physicians within their chapter by utilizing
quality reports on a monthly basis for each metric and every physician in their respective
chapter. The local chapters hold the power to “evaluate and modify” physician practices,
with potential to remove under-performing physicians from the network.
2.8 MPACT: LOWERING HEALTH CARE COSTS
MPact structures their contracts with employers around one total cost number at
the end of the year, with the expectation the quality metrics are achieved first and
foremost; MPact cannot forsake quality to decrease cost. Their commitment to the
employer is to reduce overall spending or at least reduce spending growth; this guarantee
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is the risk they take on. If MPact meets this total cost guarantee by providing all health
care services for less, then the difference in savings is split 50/50 between MPact and the
employer. This arrangement creates ownership for both the employer and MPact to drive
down costs and improve quality. For example, MPact physicians can lean into care
management techniques while employers can incentivize employees to receive wellness
screenings through premium reductions.65
When an employer contracts with MPact they are essentially contracting with the
sponsoring health plan and chapters associated with their geographic region. For
example, if an employer in Oklahoma does not have employees outside of this region,
they only contract with and receive care from Mercy health system in Oklahoma and the
associated Oklahoma chapter of physicians.
2.9 MPACT: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY
Recall the FTC guidelines state all specialties included in a CIN network must
have meaningful and sensible quality metrics applicable to each specialty; MPact’s legal
team has interpreted these requirements as needing 5-7 quality metrics per specialty
within the network. 58 The physician-led quality improvement committee has established
75 metrics and is currently reporting performance outcomes on 44 of these metrics (data
platform restrictions prohibit reporting on all metrics).68
Furthermore, a CIN is mandated to have an infrastructure to rigorously monitor
physician performance in order to evaluate and modify physician practice patterns. MPact
uses an award-winning data analytics platform to quantify quality on a monthly basis for
each physician in the network. Today’s database encompasses 180 million patient
encounters, 3 million patient lives, 3,600 active physicians sharing data measuring 44
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unique clinical metrics across 31 specialties. The quality database includes all patients
and all payers: commercial, Medicare, Medicaid, self-pay, etc. in order to hold physicians
to a higher accountability.7 This is a crucial component of the CIN as physicians may be
removed from the network for underperformance; removal is necessary to maintain
quality outcomes for patients, maintaining the integrity of the at-risk contract with the
employer and the assurance to the market MPact is a high-performing network.

67,68,70

Within the quality metric database, there is an adequate mix of process and
outcome measures along with both inpatient and outpatient/ambulatory measures. Each
metric has a goal (percentage) and minimum threshold (percentage); this minimum
threshold is used as a baseline for the CIN to evaluate and modify physician practices. All
metrics were derived from best practice research within each specialty and other outlets
such as CMS ACO metrics. 67
2.10 PUTTING IT ALTOGETHER: AN EXAMPLE OF MPACT’S SUCCESS
To begin, MPact, through the sponsoring entity (Mercy) analyzes the previous 2-3
years of employer claims data to obtain an overall cost amount guarantee. For example,
an employer was spending $1 million per year in medical costs (and the incumbent
insurance carrier charges the employer $1.2 million to take on the risk and tacks on
administration fees). MPact cross-references these claims with their own prices
(determined by Mercy’s prices) and guarantees the employer they can lower their costs to
$800 thousand per year; MPact goes at risk for anything over that guarantee.8 This saves
$200 thousand for the employer through reduced utilization plus the reduction in

7

Cost containment strategy refers only to employer, at-risk patient populations
MPact uses a reinsurance provider for catastrophic amounts beyond the total cost
guarantee

8
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insurance carrier administration fees.65,68 Once the year is over (and assuming quality
metrics are met or exceeded), if MPact exceeded the cost guarantee, they simply pay the
employer the difference. 65,68 Established employer contracts have likely trimmed all
possible costs and therefore the guarantee is to not exceed a certain growth percentage
year over year. After time, MPact has cut all possible costs and may no longer be able to
guarantee a flat rate; instead they may guarantee a slow growth percentage.65,68
From the patient/employee perspective the adjudication system is seamless with
little to no disruption in their benefits structure. Through a third-party administrator
(TPA), the beneficiaries still receive identification cards and a summary plan description
including their in-network physicians. Through this overall cost approach and detailed
patient management, MPact does not compete on price but instead, competes through
utilization and quality. Figure 2.6 details a success story between MPact (MercySpringfield chapter) and the Springfield School District.71

Figure 2.6 MPact Example of Successful Contract71
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CHAPTER 3
READMISSIONS AS A MEASURE OF QUALITY
3.1 BACKGROUND: A GROWING NEED FOR VALUE-BASED CARE
Historically, the US health system has relied upon fee-for-service (FFS)
compensation, in which physicians are reimbursed retrospectively for each service
rendered based upon billed charges or annual fee schedules without considering the cost
or resulting health outcomes. While this model has its benefits in instituting and
monitoring, it has resulted in physicians being incentivized to overuse and misuse
medical services, which in turn, has increased the health care industry’s overall spending
but has not produced higher patient outcomes and value.7,8 The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) served as the catalyst to reimburse physicians based on health outcomes or quality
care patients receive in relation to and conscious of the cost to provide such care.9,10 To
implement this paradigm shift, a value-based care model (VBCM) has emerged, which
identifies quality metrics on an organizational level and uses those to measure and
reimburse physicians for their performance over time.11,12
Patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) are a type of VBCM that have gained
popularity across the country; the ACA included federal PCMH demonstration programs
that have since expanded to private payers.15 PCMHs promote primary care
improvements including the assignment of patients to a personal primary care physician
who is responsible for directing “whole person” care coordinated efforts.16-18
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are another VBCM based upon primary care
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and originally designed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to
provide Medicare beneficiaries with high quality health care.19 The organizational
structure of an ACO is comprised of physicians, hospitals and other health care clinicians
seeking to work as a fluid team to deliver the best possible coordinated care at the lowest
possible cost. The payment structure is such that an ACO shares in any reimbursed
savings from CMS if able to deliver high quality care at a reduced cost; the ACO goes at
risk for loss if it underperforms.20
Although PCMHs and ACOs have shown promising results regarding cost
reduction, the evidence regarding the models’ impact on quality improvement still
remains scarce and with mixed results. 25,30,35,40 For instance, while the PCMH model has
shown promising results as a means for reorganizing health care systems and improving
care continuity and chronic disease management, systematic reviews evaluating PCMH
quality outcomes remain inconclusive and produce conflicting results.24,27 These studies
reported that although PCMHs were associated with a reduction in specialty visits and
improved cancer screenings, they were not positively associated with the improvement of
the majority of outcomes measured including primary care, inpatient hospitalization and
emergency department metrics.31-33
Similarly, ACOs have also shown inconsistencies in quality outcomes. Many
studies have mirrored CMS’ general conclusion that ACOs have succeeded in the
majority of quality metrics, with the greatest improvements shown in heart failure
patients, surgery outcomes, depression screenings, pneumonia vaccinations, blood
pressure control and fall risks.19,35-38 Still, additional studies found ACOs to actually
hinder areas of quality improvement such as: emergency department and inpatient

30

readmissions, adverse perioperative outcomes, a decline in prostate cancer treatment and
no discernable decrease in post-operative morbidity, mortality and readmissions.41-45
The major challenge to presenting a VBCMs success lies in understanding their
effect on quality, just as much as their effect on cost. However, quality of care is difficult
to define and measure, as data is not readily accessible. Even when a VBCM can define
quality metrics, these metrics are difficult to collect and analyze because many
inconsistencies exist. For example, PCMH literature has posited that methodological
concerns are looming regarding quality outcomes due to organizational discrepancies
under which a PCMH is formed. While the National Committee for Quality Assurance
provides guidelines for practice improvement across six categories, the components are
poorly established as to how to define, measure and collect the quality outcomes data.46
Although the taxonomy of the ACO is much better defined than in a PCMH, care
coordination and information technology to capture and report quality metrics has proven
difficult for many ACOs.47 Furthermore, ACOs have received criticism regarding the
need for a more strongly incentivized risk-sharing contract with CMS claiming they are
still a model built and dependent upon the FFS architecture, resulting in inconsistent
quality outcomes..72
A new VBCM called a clinically integrated network (CIN) has emerged amongst
the commercially insured population. A CIN is a legal entity under the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) consisting of a network of
otherwise independent physicians and hospitals/health systems who collectively commit
to cost and quality improvements.58,60 To control cost, members of the CIN are able to
negotiate directly and take on risk via an overall cost guarantee with employers for
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commercial payer contracts under safe harbor antitrust law.59,65 To meet the quality
requirement, a CIN must be physician-led and abide by a set of performance and outcome
metrics (both inpatient and outpatient in nature) decided upon by physicians. Whereas
ACOs tend to be hospital-centric and focus on primary care quality metrics, CINs are
physician-centric and their quality metrics span across all specialties within the network.
Furthermore, the CIN must have a robust data collection and analytics system in place to
monitor physician performance against these goals, where physicians are removed from
the network for consistent underperformance.59,68
Since CINs are the newest type of VBCM, the current literature explains their
formation and intended goals. However, no studies examine a CIN’s ability to improve
quality, particularly within readmissions where specialists such as hospital medicine and
emergency medicine physicians can be assessed on their individualized performance for
quality in relation to readmissions. This dissertation fills that knowledge gap by
examining one specific CIN in the Midwestern US to evaluate the effect the CIN’s
formation has on the improvement of the quality of care. In particular, this study focuses
on evaluating whether a physician (emergency medicine, internal medicine and hospital
medicine) becoming a participating member of the CIN9 reduces emergency department
and inpatient readmissions.
3.2 READMISSION QUALITY METRICS
Hospital readmissions are touted as one of the most vital quality measures
available, because their reduction is one of the best ways to bend the health care cost

9

There is slight variation in how the three major sponsors (and accompanying chapters)
facilitated the physicians becoming participating members in the CIN.
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curve. Readmissions are generally defined as a patient being admitted to a hospital within
a specified time period after being previously discharged from an earlier (initial)
hospitalization.73 Most readmissions have been reported to occur early, within one month
of discharge, which is why this 30-day time frame has been widely adopted and has
shown no recognizable difference between a readmission at 29 days versus 31 days after
discharge.49 As a measure of scrutiny, the 30-day readmission metric is easily obtained,
granular and simple to measure through an electronic medical record (EMR).74 The key
focus of the readmission outcome measure is not whether any individual readmission is
appropriate, but rather whether physician-level variations in readmissions are
preventable. While there are no truly unavoidable readmissions, most readmissions are
preventable and therefore are the responsibility of the physician and organization.75
Readmissions are of utmost importance to track as they are associated with both
high utilization and high cost. The frequency of readmissions has been well documented;
approximately 20% of Medicare patients discharged are readmitted within 30 days and
34% are readmitted within 90 days. Thus, CMS contends that 75% of these readmissions
are potentially preventable.48,76,77 In terms of cost, CMS reports that expenditures for
potentially preventable readmissions may be as high as $15 billion annually amongst the
Medicare population and as such has been made a national priority.75
Preventable hospital readmissions are just as burdensome to employers. Although
patients with private insurance are less likely to experience a readmission than those with
public health insurance, the cost of readmitting commercially insured patients is actually
higher due to higher payment rates. Nationally, readmissions cost an estimated $25
billion per year for all payers and happen frequently in the commercially insured

33

population. Furthermore, employers also pay for these readmissions indirectly in reduced
productivity and absenteeism.76 Preventable readmissions are commonly associated with
indicators of substandard care during the initial hospitalization such as poor resolution of
the main diagnosis, unstable therapy at discharge and inadequate post discharge care; all
factors controlled by physicians and health care organizations and thus hold merit to be
studied.49 Therefore, an outcome measure such as readmissions can better reflect the
overall performance of the health system being studied and incentivizes physicians and
hospitals to emphasize care that is coordinated as a global approach for all patients.
3.3 THEORY: WHY JOINING A CIN MIGHT REDUCE READMISSIONS
Donabedian posited a three-pronged approach to assessing quality derived from
structure, process and outcome by suggesting structural factors affect outcomes via their
impact on care processes.78-80 The goal of this theory is to make more explicit the
complex relationship between structural elements (hospital volume, organizational
makeup, physician attributes, etc.), process elements (surgery or other care pathways) and
outcomes (readmissions).81
This dissertation’s application of Donabedian’s theory suggests that a change in
structure occurs when physicians become participating members of the CIN and begin
providing monthly quality reporting metrics to chapter and sponsor leadership, altering
the healthcare setting. This change potentially alters the process through which
physicians deliver emergency department (ED) and inpatient care because 1) they are
now being evaluated on a monthly basis 2) can be removed from the network if
underperforming, and 3) they do not want to lose membership status in the CIN and the
accompanying market share of patients that comes with CIN membership. Process
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changes can be in the form of physician behavior (the way in which they provide care to
the patient) or through reporting (ensuring data capture is correct and complete). Thus,
the physicians focus on improving quality outcomes, which are measured in a CIN as
outcome metrics for readmissions. This process is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 Donabedian Theory Relating to Readmission Performance
3.4 STUDY DESIGN AND SETTING
This dissertation uses a retrospective, longitudinal study design. The setting is
MPact Health (MPact), a large multi-state CIN in the Midwest spanning across Missouri,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Illinois and Arkansas. The CIN is organized into nine regional
chapters (eight of which comprise the data) and are labeled as such: Central Missouri,
Missouri-Kansas, Northwest Arkansas, Northwest Missouri, Oklahoma, Springfield, MO,
St. Louis, MO, Western Arkansas and Southeast Missouri.10
MPact is comprised of over 4,000 physicians, 550 clinics and 50 hospitals that are
participative members in the network. This dissertation estimates the effect of a

Please note the Southeast Missouri chapter is part of the MPact CIN, but at the time this
dissertation was written is not yet collecting and transferring data to the analytics
platform and is therefore excluded from this analysis.

10
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physician becoming a participating member of the CIN on quality improvement in
readmissions using regression discontinuity (RD) as the empirical strategy. This study is
novel compared to the literature as the longitudinal (panel) data structure is comprised of
monthly measures following each individual physicians’ performance on readmission
quality metrics from 2016-2018, for a total of 36 months. The data also includes other
supply-side and macroeconomic time-varying covariates from 2016-2018.
3.5 DATA AND SAMPLE
Using the CINs own unique data collection and analytics platform, quality metrics
data were collected across approximately 3.1 million patients and 180 million patient
encounters from 2016-2018. The sample was constructed by aggregating patient
encounters into a monthly readmission quality metric for each physician. This yielded
185 emergency medicine physicians and 189 hospital and internal medicine physicians
over the three-year period. The practice location of the physician measured at the Zip
Code level was merged by county, with other time-varying characteristics obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Occupational Employment Statistics) and from the Census
Bureau (American Community Survey) for 2016-2018.
3.6 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Between the months of October-December of 2017, the MPact executive team
embarked on a roadshow by visiting each chapter across the five-state region of the CIN.
The purpose of the roadshow was to roll out implementation of the CIN to the practicing
physicians within the three sponsoring entities. While attendance was mandatory for
physician-leaders, attendance for all other participating physicians was not; however, the
roadshow presentation was made available via internal avenues such as internal shared
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network drives and human resource files. The roadshow presentation included
information on 1) the market landscape, 2) the legality of a CIN, 3) MPact’s cost
containment strategy and, 4) an overview of the quality metrics chosen by physician
leaders. It was explicitly explained membership within the CIN comes with the
expectation each physician is to meet or exceed the thresholds of their assigned quality
metrics, given their medical specialty. If physicians should fail to meet these goals,
action would be taken to “evaluate and modify” their performance with the potential of
being removed from the CIN. Furthermore, physicians were given policies regarding
participation, performance evaluation, improvement and remediation.
The key independent variable is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on a
value of one in the month of October, November, or December 2017 in which the
physician became a participating member of the CIN (when that particular chapter
received the roadshow). Below is the mathematical notation that determines the variable:
!"#' = 4

1 78 9 ≽ ;<9=>?@ 2017 (=@ #=E?F>?@ 2017 =@ G?<?F>?@ 2017)
0 78 9 ≺ ;<9=>?@ 2017 (=@ #=E?F>?@ 2017 =@ G?<?F>?@ 2017)

Here, becoming a member of the CIN is a deterministic function of time. Once
the time of the presentation is known, then it is known when the physician became a
member of the CIN. Becoming a member of the CIN is also a discontinuous function in
time, in that once the month where the presentation took place is reached the physician
essentially becomes “treated” by becoming a member of the CIN. Table 3.1 displays the
timeline of each chapter in the CIN receiving the roadshow or “treatment”.
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Table 3.1 Timing of MPact Roadshow by Chapter
Chapter Number

Chapter Name

Treatment Date

1

Western Arkansas

November 2017

2

Central Missouri

October 2017

3

St. Louis

November 2017

4

Missouri-Kansas

October 2017

5

Springfield

December 2017

6

NW Arkansas

November 2017

7

Oklahoma

December 2017

8

NW Missouri

November 2017

3.7 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables are outcome quality metrics associated with
readmissions within eight specific chapters of the CIN.
ED to ED readmissions within 72 hours (ED): This metric is a hospital-care
metric for physicians within the emergency medicine specialty, yielding 6,624
observations. The metric is defined as the percentage of patients readmitted within 72
hours from ED to ED with any diagnosis. Specifically, a patient qualifies if they are
discharged from an emergency department admission and is subsequently readmitted to
the emergency department within 72 hours. For ED to ED readmissions, any attending
physicians attached to the patient receive the readmission count. As a result, a particular
patient could have multiple physicians involved. However, this is unlikely in the ED
setting, as the more prevalent encounter is where only one physician attends the initial
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ED visit. Figure 3.2 depicts how the assignment of a readmission count is attributed to an
emergency medicine physician.

Figure 3.2 Assignment of ED Readmission Count
Readmissions in seven days within same MS-DRG11 (7Day): This metric is a
hospital-care metric for physicians within the specialties of hospital medicine and internal
medicine, yielding 6,804 observations. The metric is defined as the percentage of
patients readmitted within seven days with the same MS-DRG. Specifically, a patient
qualifies if they are discharged after an inpatient encounter and then readmitted for an
inpatient encounter for an issue in the same MS-DRG within seven calendar days.
Readmissions in 30 days within same MS-DRG (30DaySame): This metric is a
hospital-care metric for physicians within the specialties of hospital medicine and internal
medicine, yielding 6,804 observations. The metric is defined as the percentage of
patients readmitted within 30 days with the same MS-DRG. Specifically, a patient
qualifies if they are discharged after an inpatient encounter and then readmitted for an
inpatient encounter for an issue in the same MS-DRG within 30 calendar days.

11

MS-DRG is the Medicare Severity-Diagnostic Related Group used to classify hospital
care into one of 476 groups. Patients are assigned to a particular MS-DRG based on
diagnosis, procedures, age, sex and discharge status.
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Readmissions in 30 days with any diagnosis (30DayAny): This metric is a
hospital-care metric for physicians within the specialties of hospital medicine and internal
medicine, yielding 6,840 observations. The metric is defined as the percentage of
patients readmitted within 30 days with any diagnosis. Specifically, a patient qualifies if
they are discharged after an inpatient encounter and then readmitted for an inpatient
encounter for any issue within 30 calendar days.
For all inpatient readmission dependent variables (7Day, 30DaySame and
30DayAny), the last attending physician attached to the patient receives the readmission
count, regardless of how many physicians treated the patient receiving care during the
inpatient stay. Figure 3.3 depicts how the assignment of a readmission count is attributed
to a hospital medicine or internal medicine physician.

Figure 3.3 Assignment of Inpatient Readmission Count
All the dependent variable metrics are considered to be rolling metrics; meaning
the metrics are reported on a rolling 12-month basis. For example, if a patient is
readmitted (and this count is therefore attributed to a physician), the particular readmitted
patient will be counted as a part of this total metric for 12 months until the encounter
drops out of the calculation. The reason a rolling metric is utilized for measurement of
performance is it allows physicians who may go on vacation or who are not on call for a
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particular month to consistently have data reported across the time they are affiliated with
the CIN. Furthermore, the data analytics tool from which MPact gathers their quality
metric data is only able to pull data from physicians who have a total patient count of at
least 30 over a specified time period. This minimum count is not typically a concern
when looking at a physicians’ performance on readmissions, as even in the most rural
areas of MPact’s network, readmissions still meet this minimum count. However, this
minimum count does become problematic for sub-specialists such as neurosurgeons and
cardiothoracic surgeons whose total patient counts are far less in any given month.
Couple this with surgeons who serve rural communities or go on vacation for several
weeks and the total patient count dips dramatically. The 12-month rolling reporting
system is put in place to counteract these possible fluctuations and ensure data is being
recorded for all physicians on a monthly basis.
3.8 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To determine the effect of physicians becoming participating members of the CIN
on physician performance, this dissertation employs a regression discontinuity (RD)
design on physician-level panel data to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE).
RD designs are of growing importance within economics;82-84 a handful of applications
are being used to understand how changes in health insurance policies affect utilization
and cost.85-88 However, these designs are still underutilized within medicine and public
health.89,90
This dissertation follows an application of the RD design by using time as the
assignment variable to identify the effects of CIN membership; referred to as RDiT. 82,9194

To apply RDiT in this dissertation, panel data on physician performance is needed.
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With this data structure, following the individual physician’s performance over each
month in time from 2016 to 2018 allows for the use of time-invariant aspects associated
with the physician that might affect their performance to be controlled for using “fixed”
effects.
In this RDiT design, the month acts as the assignment variable determining when
a physician became a member in the CIN (CINi,c,t). In sharp RD designs, the treatment
switches on as the assignment variable passes a cutoff. Applied to this context, when t
passes October 2017 (or November or December 2017 depending on when the chapter
received the presentation) the physician becomes “treated” by becoming a member of the
CIN. A linear regression estimating equation demonstrating the RDiT is:
($,&,' =∝* + +, !"#$,&,' + -$ + .¢' /' + 0¢$& 1$& + 2$,&,'
Where, ($,&,' is the readmission quality metric (ED, 7Day, 30DaySame or 30DayAny) for
each physician (emergency medicine, hospital medicine or internal medicine), i, in
chapter, c, during month, t. The parameter, +, , captures the effect of the physician
becoming a member of the CIN on the readmission quality metric (physician
performance). The equation includes, -$ , which represents physician fixed effects
mentioned above, .¢' /' , which is a time fixed effect including months 1-36 and 0¢$& 1$& ,
which captures a chapter fixed effect for eight chapters. The error term, 2$,&,' , represents
the remaining unobserved variation in physician attributes.
The key assumption for identification in an RD is physicians are unable to
precisely manipulate the assignment variable (month in which their chapter joined the
CIN) then the variation in the quality metric near the time of joining is randomized. This
assumption holds because MPact determined the date of the roadshow within each
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chapter, not the individual physician. Descriptive summary statistics were conducted to
characterize the data, identify outliers, and address any misreported data. All descriptive
and inferential statistics were conducted using Stata/MP 15.1 (StataCorp LP; College
Station, TX).
3.9 VALIDATING THE USE OF REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
Guidance to researchers in applying and validating the RD and RDiT designs has
been evolving since 2010.82,90,95,96 Keys to validation of the design lie in a graphical
inspection of the data and conducting careful sensitivity analyses. In applying this
guidance, I first graphed the quality metrics that represent the dependent variable against
the individual months from 2016 to 2018 and visually looked for breaks in trend around
the time of the roadshow. It has become standard to summarize the effect of RD and
RDiT designs by showing the relationship between the dependent variable and the
assignment variable.90 Visualization of the quality metrics against time should show
whether a change in performance occurred around the time of the road show. It also
helps to elucidate whether the relationship between physician performance and time is
linear, or if other non-linear specifications are needed.
My estimation accounts for the presence of time-varying confounders by running
specifications that include controls for other major supply and demand factors that might
affect physician performance. A description of these variables and their sources is
outlined in Section 3.10.
3.10 IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLS AND TIME-VARYING COVARIATES
Since this study uses panel data that follows each individual physicians’ monthly
performance on readmission quality metrics, I am primarily relying on the within
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physician variation to control for some of the unmeasured physician characteristics. The
assumption is the physician is serving as his or her own control and that the unmeasured
physician characteristics that are fixed will not confound the estimate of the roadshow.
In this context, a “fixed” effect means the variable has the same effect on the physician
performance prior to and after the roadshow. For example, the gender or race of the
physician does not change from 2016 to 2018; therefore, they do not have an effect on the
dependent variables of interest, when panel data is used to estimate the effect. However,
aspects about the physician or their environment that can affect performance must be
controlled for. Additional time varying physician level data is not available; however,
examples of time-varying county-level variables from the macro level that might affect a
physicians’ performance are found in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Covariate Data Sources
Variable
Number of
Primary Care
Providers
(Supply-Side)
Total Population
(Demand-Side)
Percent
Insurance
(Demand-Side)

Year(s)
2016-2018

Geographic Level
Metropolitan and
Non-Metropolitan
Areas

2016-2017
2018*

County

2016-2017
2018*

County

2016-2017
Percent Non2018*
White or
Hispanic
(Demand-Side)
*2018 data to be released in October 2019

County

Source
Occupational
Employment
Statistics, Bureau of
Labor Statistics
American
Community Survey,
1-year estimates,
Census Bureau
American
Community Survey,
1-year estimates,
Census Bureau
American
Community Survey,
1-year estimates,
Census Bureau

These variables change over time and might affect readmission quality metrics
because they affect the demand and supply of patients with readmissions. They are
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measured at the county level and vary annually because this is the smallest geographic
level that allows for the most variation over time. Searches of publicly available data at
the county-level did not reveal monthly measures. The variables found in Table 3.2 were
also used in similar studies evaluating the impact of PCMHs and ACOs on
quality.24,30,36,40
3.11 RESULTS
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics of dependent variables (quality metrics)
and covariates by year (2016-2018).
Table 3.3 Descriptive Characteristics of Readmission Quality Metrics
Dependent Variables
ED
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
7Day
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
30DaySame
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
30DayAny
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Covariates

2016
(1)

2017
(2)

2018
(3)

2016-2018
(4)

2,208
0.036
0.012
0
0.079

2,208
0.038
0.012
0
0.091

2,208
0.040
0.013
0
0.101

6,624
0.038
0.012
0
0.101

2,268
0.007
0.007
0
0.063

2,268
0.007
0.009
0
0.111

2,268
0.008
0.012
0
0.111

6,804
0.007
0.009
0
0.111

2,268
0.021
0.037
0
1

2,268
0.022
0.021
0
0.333

2,268
0.022
0.018
0
0.119

6,804
0.022
0.027
0
1

2,280
0.123
0.062
0
1

2,280
0.136
0.069
0
1

2,280
0.146
0.078
0
1

6,840
0.137
0.070
0
1
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Physician
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Total Population
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Percent Uninsured
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
White
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Black
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

5,8685
1,193.19
1,218.768
50
2,750

6,048
1,044.702
1,094.032
50
2,570

5,832
952.099
962.482
90
2,340

5,544
5,544
436,585.40 438,067.40
356,244.00 355,815.40
83,972
85,006
986,410
984,505
5,544
8.680
2.221
6.50
13.60

5,544
9.266
2.268
6.40
13.70

5,544
5,544
327,133.20 326,168.60
234,623.70 230,774.40
77,933
76,775
684,030
674,608
3,168
2,232
123,794.20 172,850.30
101,284.90 84,293.60
10,029
14,127
238,612
241,023

In general, quality measures remained consistent across the three-year time period
and saw a very slight increase as the years progressed. Across the entire sample, average
ED readmissions performance (Column 4) was 3.8% with a minimum of zero and a
maximum of 10%. In each individual year, average ED readmissions increased from
3.6% in 2016 to 4% in 2018 (Columns 1-3). Both 7Day readmissions and 30DaySame
readmissions saw smaller averages across the sample, 0.7% and 2.2% (Column 4),
respectively. For both these variables, variation in the average across the individual years
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was limited. Average 30DayAny readmissions across the sample were higher as
compared to the 30DaySame metric, 13.7% vs. 2.2% (Column 4). This is expected since
readmissions for the 30DayAny metric 30-day period are counted for any diagnosis
within this 30-day period, whereas the readmission for the 30DaySame metric is only
counted for the same MS-DRG. Both 30DaySame and 30DayAny metrics had maximum
values of 100%. While initially these maximum values may seem like outliers, these
physicians remained within the sample for two reasons. First, many physicians within
Mpact’s network practice in rural settings. As such, a physician may care for only one
patient in a given month. If that one patient is readmitted within the 30-day timeframe,
the metric shows a 100% readmission performance for the physician and still warrants
inclusion. Second, this scenario was seen across numerous physicians and chapters,
further justifying inclusion in the estimation.
Across each individual year, averages for both 30DaySame and 30DayAny
readmissions showed little variation across the sample. 30DaySame slightly increased
from 2.1% in 2016 to 2.2% in 2018 while 30DayAny increased from 12.3% in 2016 to
14.6% in 2018 (Columns 1-3). The covariates also demonstrated had little fluctuation in
their averages across individual years. Number of primary care physicians in the sample
showed a slight decrease year over year (Columns 1-3); this follows suit to the national
trend.97,98 Total population slightly increased as well as percent uninsured. Lastly,
percent of the population that is white slightly decreased while percent black had a
sizable increase.
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Figure 3.4 Scatter Plots of Dependent Variable Readmission Metrics Over Time

In Figure 3.4, scatter plots show the relationship of the readmission metrics over
time. These were examined for visible breaks or discontinuity in trend around the time of
the roadshow to see if the CINs formation may have an impact on physician performance.
Upon inspection in the top left panel and bottom left panel of Figure 3.4, the ED and
30DaySame metrics remained relatively static over time. For the ED metric many of the
observations lie between 1% and 6%; for the 30DaySame metric most observations lie
between 0 and 1.5%. In the top right panel and bottom right panel, the 7Day and
30DayAny measures show a bit more variation overall. While both metrics show most
observations lie between 0 and 2.5%, there are considerably more outlying data points
than in the ED and 30DaySame metrics.
In Table 3.4, I present estimates demonstrating the impact of physicians becoming
participating members of a CIN (MPact) on readmissions. I employed three models
consisting of different empirical specifications. The first model exploits the variation in
the readmission metrics over time and controls for physician-fixed effects. In the second
model, chapter and time fixed effects are added to the first model’s specification. In the
third model, time-varying county-level controls are added to the second model’s
specification.
Overall, there were no discernable statistically significant findings for the impact
of physicians becoming participating members of the CIN on emergency department and
inpatient readmissions (Table 3.4). Three statistically significant findings indicate a
slight increase in ED (0.003), 7Day (0.0013) and 30DayAny (0.0133) readmissions when
including only physician-fixed effects in the estimating model.
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Table 3.4 The Effect of Physicians Becoming Members of a CIN on Emergency
Department and Inpatient Readmissions Quality Metrics
Dependent
Variable

Model
1

ED

2
3
1

7Day

2
3
1

30DaySame

2
3
1

30DayAny

2
3

"# $%&',),*

Physician
Fixed Effect

0.0003*
(0.0007)
-0.0002
(0.0007)
-0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0013*
(0.0007)
-0.0005
(0.0011)
0.0012
(0.0012)
0.0004
(0.0014)
0.0011
(0.0021)
-0.0088
(.0042)
0.0133*
(0.0038)
-0.0072
(0.0051)
-0.0040
(0.0057)

Chapter &
Time Fixed
Effect

TimeVarying
Controls

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

* Significant at <.01
Although this model shows an increase in readmissions, the magnitude is virtually
zero, and factors outside of the roadshow within the chapter, or a specific month in time
may be driving these effects. In controlling for those factors, models two and three
demonstrate declines in all readmission metrics, however the effects are not statistically
significant.
3.12 DISCUSSION
Across specifications, there were no meaningful statistically significant findings
of the effect of physicians becoming members of a CIN (MPact) across all four
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readmissions quality metrics. These findings are consistent with previous literature on
VBCMs that examine quality of care as an outcome of interest 34,36,39,40,99 There are two
main explanations for these findings. First, looking at the presence of the treatment (the
CIN formation through the roadshow) and expecting there to be a comprehensive impact
on physician-level readmission outcome metrics may be too indirect. Physicians were
not required to attend the CIN presentation by MPact in person. This lack of a
requirement for attendance makes sense, as requiring all emergency medicine, hospital
medicine and internal medicine physicians to leave their work to attend a presentation
would almost certainly result in adverse patient events. Furthermore, while the roadshow
presentation was made available through internal channels such as human resources and
shared network drives, there is no way to know exactly which physicians viewed the
presentation, and if they did view it, the timing of when it was viewed. The lack of a
requirement to attend the presentation in person or view it via internal channels explains
the lack of effect on readmission quality metrics.
Second, MPact is comprised of already high-performing health systems, whose
readmission quality metrics are fairly low. For example, the average 30DaySame
readmission across the sample showed limited variation (2.1% to 2.2% average) across
time; while the national average readmission variation is between 7% and 14%.100 Since
the readmission quality metrics are already low (the national average is around 20%)100
demonstrating limited readmissions, improving upon them is fundamentally more
difficult. Mosaic and Mercy have been two of the leading success stories in the country
amongst ACOs. While ACO metrics differ from those evaluated in this dissertation, it is
reasonable to assume the high performance demanded within an ACO may spillover to
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the physician quality metrics assessed by the CIN. This may also explain the low
averages for each readmission metric such as 7Day readmissions, which averaged a 0.7%
readmission performance. Therefore, the impact of the roadshow presentation may not
have had an effect because physicians were already at near optimal performance.
The findings from this chapter suggest that a strategy targeted directly towards
physicians within MPact could more clearly improve readmission metrics. Per the
Donabedian model, the next logical step would be to make the conceptual framework
tighter by conducting a more impactful structural change targeted toward dissemination
of metrics. Such a strategy would involve dissemination of each individual physicians’
readmission metric outcomes being given directly to each emergency medicine, hospital
medicine and internal medicine physician. Furthermore, taking an additional step to
unblind these results so that physicians can not only see their own performance but the
performance of their peers, would potentially have an even greater effect on quality.
Behavioral economic literature has shown that physicians who have a true sense of
ownership will exhibit the strongest response to quality-based incentives as their
reputations are at stake and they hold residual claim to any value added to the
organization.101-103
Another possible strategy could be the implementation of financial incentives tied
to each readmission metric. While MPact’s current incentives increase market share with
risk of being removed from the network for underperformance, these may not be strong
enough to elucidate an effect. There is substantial literature regarding positive physician
response through the use of financial motivation.14,104-107
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These findings should be interpreted within the limitations of the study. First, this
analysis did not compare this CIN to other VBCMs such as ACOs and PCMHs but
instead compared physicians within this one CIN over time. Thus, these findings cannot
make conclusions about quality outcomes in the CIN model versus other models.
Likewise, this study cannot assert findings on any other established CINs. Instead, the
goal was to evaluate physician performance both within individual physicians and across
physicians over time through the use of readmission quality metrics. Second, these
readmission metrics, while evaluated monthly for each physician, are aggregated and
reported on for a rolling 12-months. MPact’s reasoning for this is twofold. One, by
using a rolling 12 months it eliminates small sample sizes on a monthly basis and two,
this is the standard way their data analytics platform reports data. Unfortunately, this
method of reporting thwarts variation whereas using the raw monthly performance per
physician maintains greater variation both within and amongst physicians for a more
accurate measure. Third, although the quality metrics in the database encompass all
payers (private, self-insured, Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare, etc.), I do not know if certain
physicians have a predominant payer mix, which could influence results. This was
somewhat adjusted for using covariates, but this method was imperfect as many
physicians could not be matched to a specific zip code.
3.13 CONCLUSION
This dissertation provides the first early evaluation of quality performance of
physicians participating in a CIN. Furthermore, this study contributes to the growing
body of literature on the impact of VBCMs on health care quality outcomes. Overall, the
findings of this chapter of the dissertation suggest little impact on readmission metrics
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after physicians became participating members of the CIN. Because the CIN model is
new, it is likely its impact will increase over time. Therefore, future research should
incorporate additional years of data to evaluate these effects along with any future
strategies MPact adopts to improve quality outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4
QUALITY IN CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE
4.1 BACKGROUND: THE NEED FOR VALUE-BASED CARE
Fee-for-service (FFS) is the historically popular mechanism the US has used for
physician compensation. Through FFS, physicians are reimbursed retrospectively for
each service rendered based upon annual fee schedules or billed charges without taking
into account the cost or resulting outcome. While this model is beneficial due to its ease
of implementation and monitoring, it has resulted in physicians being incentivized to
overuse and misuse medical services. As a concept, FFS promotes quantity over quality
where physicians assume an overbearing number of patients. This fosters poor time
commitment for communication and coordination between other physicians, creating a
siloed and fragmented system.7,8 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) forced a paradigm
shift to instead begin paying for value, defined as the health outcomes or quality of care
the patient receives in relation to and conscious of the cost to provide such care.9,10 This
new reimbursement method is referred to as a value-based care model (VBCM) as it ties
payment for the delivery of health care services directly to the quality of health care
being provided and rewards physicians for implementing an efficient and effective
medical practice; incentivizing quality over quantity.11,12
The patient-centered medical home (PCMH) is one model included as a federal
demonstration program in the ACA and has since expanded to private payers.15 PCMHs
promote improvements to primary care coupled with the implementation of advanced
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electronic medical records (EMR), care transition teams, population health initiatives and
quality outcome reporting for payments, typically seen as per-patient-per-month fees for
services rendered.16-18 Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are another type of
VBCM centered around primary care and introduced by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide these beneficiaries with high quality medical care.
They have been touted as the most promising result to drive down cost and improve
quality; there are now more than 700 ACOs across the country. If an ACO succeeds in
delivering coordinated care at the lowest possible cost, the savings are shared with CMS.
However, the ACO does go at risk to lose money if it underperforms on cost and quality
and is taken as financial loss.20
The vast majority of PCMH and ACO literature focuses on improvement in cost
reduction; quality results have been scarce and mixed.25,30,35,40 Various studies amongst
PCMHs have shown improvements in patient satisfaction, disease management and
preventive health while other studies have shown poor quality outcomes in
hospitalization and emergency medicine.28-33 Alternatively, one study found there was no
impact on any quality improvement metrics from nine separate and distinct PCMHs.34
Similarly, ACOs have shown inconsistencies in quality outcomes. The greatest
improvements in quality have been in the areas of heart failure, surgery outcomes, fall
risk, pneumonia vaccinations and depression screenings.19,35-38 Conversely, studies have
shown poor quality outcomes among ACOs in the areas of 30-day readmissions, asthma
and diabetes care, prostate cancer treatment, adverse perioperative outcomes and no
discernable decrease in post-operative morbidity, mortality and readmissions.39-45
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Overall, VBCM success lies in both cost containment and quality improvement;
the latter is difficult to define and measure as data is not readily accessible. Even when a
VBCM is able to define quality metrics, they are often difficult to collect and analyze, as
many inconsistencies exist. PCMHs were originally formed as a way to practice
medicine with the primary care physician at the epicenter and did not include any
incentive or penalty designs, which could explain why many have resulted in small
amounts of overall quality improvements.108 Likewise, PCMHs have focused on their
patient population using a fixed set of structural features where high-risk patients are
unaccustomed to utilizing primary care services and instead utilize inpatient and
emergency services, which results in low comorbidity control and care continuity for
these patients.109 Similarly, some ACO literature has concluded the Medicare population
of an ACO, linked with old age and chronically ill patients, is credited with the quality
demise. It has therefore been suggested this population is simply not ideal to study
quality outcomes.19
In response to the challenges facing PCMHs and ACOs, a new VBCM called a
clinically integrated network (CIN) has emerged amongst the commercially insured
population. The CIN originated as employers began to search for better options to
control health care costs and ensure consistent quality of care for their employees. A CIN
is considered a legal entity under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department
of Justice (DOJ) consisting of a network of otherwise independent physicians and
hospitals/health systems collectively committing to cost containment and quality
improvements, built upon the ACA. 58,60 Through an overall cost guarantee, a CIN
negotiates directly and takes on risk with employers for commercial payer contracts
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under safe harbor antitrust law. Where the CIN model takes cost one step further than
other VBCMs is the commitment to quality; the CIN must meet or exceed quality metrics
before the CIN can qualify for the risk sharing payout.59,65 In order to properly monitor
quality outcome metrics (both inpatient and outpatient) through physician performance,
the CIN must have a robust data collection and analytics platform. This is necessary for
the CIN to measure physicians against the metrics in order to “evaluate and modify”
practice patterns and behavior. Lastly, any physicians continuously not meeting the
threshold for the quality metrics can be removed from the network.59,68 Given the legal
requirements, organizational structure and commercial patient population, the CIN may
be more conducive for studying its effect on quality compared to other VBCMs.
Since CINs are the newest type of VBCM to enter the market, the current
literature explains their formation and intended goals. However, no studies examine the
ability of a CIN to improve quality outcomes, particularly with a condition like
cardiovascular disease (CVD) where specialists, such as cardiologists and cardiothoracic
surgeons, can be assessed on their individualized performance for quality in relation to
CVD. This dissertation fills this knowledge gap by examining one specific CIN in the
Midwestern US to evaluate the effect the CINs formation has on the improvement of the
quality of care. In particular, this study focuses on evaluating whether a physician
(cardiologist or cardiothoracic surgeon) becoming a participating member of the CIN12
improves quality outcomes in CVD.

12

There is slight variation in how the three major sponsors (and accompanying chapters)
facilitated the physicians becoming participating members in the CIN.
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4.2 CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE QUALITY METRICS
CVD is a class of diseases or diagnoses that involve the heart or blood vessels.
The most common diseases under the CVD umbrella are Coronary Artery Disease
(CAD), Congestive Heart Failure (CHF), Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI),
hypertension, cardiomyopathy and arrhythmias.110 CVD is the leading cause of death in
the US accounting for approximately 800,000 deaths per year; moreover, nearly 965,000
people a year suffer AMI. Likewise, CVD is associated with a significant risk of
mortality and reduced quality of life.111
CVD costs the US health care system around $315 billion dollars annually in
health care services, medications and lost productivity and is projected to triple by 2030
to almost $900 billion. 112 CVD also sees the highest utilization rates in the health care
industry compared to other prevalent diseases. It is estimated that by 2030, almost half of
the US population will present with some form of CVD. 113,114 The economic burden of
CVD is just as troublesome to employers due to its chronic nature. This disease is highly
prevalent among the working population; almost 47% of CVD patients are younger than
64 years of age and therefore are likely to need to continue working.115 Employers are
interested in reducing rates of chronic diseases such as CVD as they bear about 85% of
the total employee medical costs, with hypertension comprising the largest share.116
Furthermore, the impact of CVD on physical and mental wellbeing greatly impairs an
individual’s ability to engage in work and productivity. Estimated CVD-related
productivity loss is around $192 billion and presenteeism costs around $43 billion in the
US. Likewise, people employed while suffering CVD often require long lengths of time
off to recover from illness and surgery related to this illness; reducing their income and

59

overall employer output. This creates a productivity loss in the wider economic sense
when people of working age die due to CVD; it is approximated that 17% of CVD death
occur in people younger than age 65.111 Employers are growing more concerned for their
workforce and their bottom line and are in need of physicians and programs to help curb
the costs and utilization of CVD. A model such as the CIN may be able to help reduce
cost and improve quality for CVD patients and employers alike.
4.3 THEORY: WHY JOINING A CIN MIGHT IMPROVE QUALTY IN CVD
Donabedian posited a three-pronged approach in the assessment of quality derived
from structure, process and outcome; postulating structural factors affect outcomes via
their impact on processes.79 The goal of this theory is to explicitly describe the complex
relationship between structural elements (hospital volume, organizational makeup,
physician attributes, etc.), process elements (diagnosis, procedures or other care
pathways) and outcome (disease improvement).117,118
This dissertation’s application of the Donabedian theory suggests a change in
structure occurs when physicians become participating members of the CIN, altering the
setting. This change then potentially alters the process through which physicians deliver
care to patients with CVD because 1) they are now being evaluated on a monthly basis,
2) can be removed from the network if underperforming, and 3) they do not want to lose
membership status in the CIN and the accompanying market share of patients that
naturally transpires with CIN membership. Process changes can be in the form of
physician behavior (the way in which they provide care to the patient) or through
reporting (ensuring data capture is correct and complete). Thus, the physicians focus on
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improving corresponding process outcomes, which are measured in a CIN as process
metrics for patients with CVD. This process is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Donabedian Model in Relation to CVD Quality
4.4 STUDY DESIGN AND SETTING
This dissertation uses a retrospective, longitudinal study design. The setting is
MPact Health, a large multi-state CIN in the Midwest spanning across Missouri, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Illinois and Arkansas. The CIN is organized into nine regional chapters
(eight of which comprise the data) and are labeled as such: Central Missouri, MissouriKansas, Northwest Arkansas, Northwest Missouri, Oklahoma, Springfield, MO, St.
Louis, MO, Western Arkansas and Southeast Missouri.13
MPact is comprised of over 4,000 physicians, 550 clinics and 50 hospitals that are
participative members in the network. This dissertation estimates the effect of a
physician becoming a participating member of the CIN on quality improvement in CVD
using regression discontinuity (RD) as the empirical strategy. This study is novel

Please note that the Southeast Missouri chapter is a part of the MPact CIN, but at the
time this dissertation was written is not yet collecting and transferring data to the CIN
collections and analytics platform and is therefore excluded from this analysis.

13
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compared to the literature as the longitudinal (panel) data structure is comprised of
monthly measures following each individual physician’s performance on CVD quality
metrics from 2016-2018, for a total of 36 months. The data also includes other supplyside and macroeconomic time-varying covariates on a monthly basis from 2016-2018.
4.5 DATA AND SAMPLE
Using the CINs own award-winning data collection and analytics platform,
quality metrics data were collected across approximately 3.1 million patients and 180
million patient encounters from 2016-2018. The sample was constructed by aggregating
patient encounters into a monthly CVD quality metric for each physician. To be included
in the sample, the physician had to be a participating member of MPact in 2016, 2017 and
2018. This yielded 35 cardiothoracic surgeons and 55 cardiologists over the three-year
period. The practice location of the physician measured at the Zip Code level was
merged by county with other time-varying characteristics obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (Occupational Employment Statistics) and from the Census Bureau
(American Community Survey) for 2016-2018.
4.6 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Between the months of October-December of 2017, the MPact executive team
embarked on a roadshow by visiting each chapter across the five-state region of the CIN.
The purpose of the roadshow was to roll out implementation of the CIN to the practicing
physicians within the three sponsoring entities. While attendance was mandatory for
physician-leaders, attendance for all other participating physicians was not; however, the
roadshow presentation was made available via internal avenues such as internal shared
network drives and human resource files. The roadshow presentation included
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information on 1) the market landscape, 2) the legality of a CIN, 3) MPact’s cost
containment strategy and, 4) an overview of the quality metrics chosen by physician
leaders. It was explicitly explained membership within the CIN comes with the
expectation each physician is to meet or exceed the thresholds of their assigned quality
metrics, given their medical specialty. If physicians should fail to meet these goals,
action would be taken to “evaluate and modify” their performance with the potential of
being removed from the CIN. Furthermore, physicians were given policies regarding
participation, performance evaluation, improvement and remediation.
The key independent variable is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes on a
value of one in the month of October, November, or December 2017 in which the
physician became a participating member of the CIN (when that particular chapter
received the roadshow). Table 4.1 displays the timeline of each chapter in the CIN
receiving the roadshow or “treatment”.
Table 4.1 Timing of MPact Roadshow by Chapter
Chapter Number

Chapter Name

Treatment Date

1

Western Arkansas

November 2017

2

Central Missouri

October 2017

3

St. Louis

November 2017

4

Missouri-Kansas

October 2017

5

Springfield

December 2017

6

NW Arkansas

November 2017

7

Oklahoma

December 2017

8

NW Missouri

November 2017
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Below is the mathematical notation that determines the variable:
+,-. = 0

1 23 4 ≽ 67489:; 2017 (8; -8@:A9:; 2017 8; B:7:A9:; 2017)
0 23 4 ≺ 67489:; 2017 (8; -8@:A9:; 2017 8; B:7:A9:; 2017)

Here, becoming a member of the CIN is a deterministic function of time, so once
time the presentation took place is known, then it is known when the physician became a
member of the CIN. Becoming a member of the CIN is also a discontinuous function in
time, in that once the month where the presentation took place is reached the physician
essentially becomes “treated” by becoming a member of the CIN.
4.7 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variable is a process quality metric associated with CVD.
Patients with AMI diagnosis and received aspirin within 90 minutes of arrival
(AMI): This process metric is a hospital-care metric for physicians within the
cardiothoracic surgery and cardiology specialties and is specific to the disease state of
AMI under the CVD umbrella. Giving patients aspirin during the early stages of a heart
attack is shown to slow the risk of clotting and decrease the size of any blood clots have
already formed.119 This metric is defined as an indication of whether the patient received
a delivery of aspirin within the first 90 minutes of the selected encounter. Specifically,
principal AMI diagnosis is defined according to the National Hospital Quality Measure
standard as patients (encounters) who received an ICD-9 diagnosis code of 410.*0 or
410.*1, or equivalent ICD-10 diagnosis code. Only inpatients who have been discharged
are available for reporting.
The dependent variable metric is considered to be a rolling metric; meaning the
metric is reported on a rolling 12-month basis. For example, if a patient is not prescribed
aspirin within the 90-minute window, the particular CVD patient will be counted as a part
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of this total metric for 12 months until the encounter drops out of the calculation. The
reason a rolling metric is utilized for measurement of performance is it allows physicians
who may go on vacation or who are not on call for a particular month to consistently
have data reported across the time they are affiliated with the CIN. The data analytics
platform from which MPact gathers their quality metric data is only available to pull data
from physicians who have a total patient count of at least 30 over a specified period of
time. This minimum count is of great concern when looking at a physicians’
performance on CVD, as sub-specialists such as cardiologists and cardiothoracic
surgeons may have small patients counts in any given month as compared to a primary
care physician. Couple this with specialists and surgeons who serve rural communities or
go on vacation for several weeks and the total patient count drops dramatically. The 12month rolling reporting system is put in place to counteract these possible fluctuations
and ensure data is being recorded for all physicians on a monthly basis.
4.8 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To determine the effect of physicians becoming participating members of the CIN
on physician performance, this dissertation employs a regression discontinuity (RD)
design on physician-level panel data to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE).
When the assumptions of RD are fully met, this methodology has almost the same causal
force as those from a randomized controlled trial.84 RD designs are of growing
importance within economics,82,83 a handful of applications are being used to understand
how changes in health insurance policies affect utilization and cost.85-88 However, these
designs are still underutilized within medicine and public health.89,90
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This dissertation follows an application of the RD design by using time as the
assignment variable to identify the effects of CIN membership; referred to as RDiT.82,9194

. To apply RDiT in this dissertation, panel data on physician performance is needed.

With this data structure, following the individual physician’s performance over each
month in time from 2016 to 2018 allows for the use of time-invariant aspects associated
with the physician that might affect their performance to be controlled for using “fixed”
effects.
In this RDiT design, the month acts as the assignment variable determining when
a physician became a member in the CIN (CINi,c,t). In sharp RD designs, the treatment
switches on as the assignment variable passes a cutoff. Applied to this context, when t
passes October 2017 (or November or December 2017 depending on when the chapter
received the presentation) then the physician becomes “treated” by becoming a member
of the CIN. A linear regression estimating equation with this variable of interest is:
EF,G,. =∝I + KL +,-F,G,. + MF + N¢. O. + P¢FG QFG + RF,G,. .
Where, EF,G,. is the CVD quality metric (AMI) for each physician (cardiothoracic surgeon
or cardiologist), i, in chapter, c, during month, t. The parameter, KL , captures the effect of
the physician becoming a member of the CIN on the CVD quality metric (physician
performance). The equation includes, MF , which represents physician fixed effects
mentioned above, N¢. O. , which is a time fixed effect including months 1-36 and P¢FG QFG ,
which captures a chapter fixed effect for eight chapters. The error term, RF,G,. , represents
the remaining unobserved variation in physician attributes.
The key assumption for identification in an RD is physicians are unable to
precisely manipulate the assignment variable (month in which their chapter joined the
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CIN) then the variation in the quality metric near the time of joining is randomized. This
assumption holds because MPact determined the date of the roadshow within each
chapter, not the individual physician. Descriptive summary statistics were conducted to
characterize the data, identify outliers, and address any misreported data. All descriptive
and inferential statistics were conducted using Stata/MP 15.1 (StataCorp LP; College
Station, TX).
4.9 VALIDATING THE USE OF REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
Guidance to researchers in applying and validating the RD and RDiT designs has
been evolving since 2010.82,90,95,96 Keys to validation of the design lie in a graphical
inspection of the data and conducting careful sensitivity analyses. In applying this
guidance, I first graphed the quality metrics that represent the dependent variable against
the individual months from 2016 to 2018 and visually looked for breaks in trend around
the time of the roadshow. It has become standard to summarize the effect of RD and
RDiT designs by showing the relationship between the dependent variable and the
assignment variable.90 Visualization of the quality metrics against time should show
whether a change in performance occurred around the time of the road show. It also
helps to elucidate whether the relationship between physician performance and time is
linear, or if other non-linear specifications are needed.
My estimation accounts for the presence of time-varying confounders by running
specifications that include controls for other major supply and demand factors that might
affect physician performance. A description of these variables and their sources is
outlined in Section 4.10.
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4.10 IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLS AND TIME-VARYING COVARIATES
Since this study uses panel data that follows each individual physicians’ monthly
performance on CVD quality metrics, I am primarily relying on the within physician
variation to control for some of the unmeasured physician characteristics. The
assumption is the physician is serving as his or her own control and that the unmeasured
physician characteristics that are fixed will not confound the estimate of the roadshow.
In this context, a “fixed” effect means the variable has the same effect on the physician
performance prior to and after the roadshow. For example, the gender or race of the
physician does not change from 2016 to 2018; therefore, they do not have an effect on the
dependent variables of interest, when panel data is used to estimate the effect. However,
aspects about the physician or their environment that can affect performance must be
controlled for.
Table 4.2 Covariate Data Sources
Variable
Number of
Primary Care
Providers
(Supply-Side)

Year(s)

Geographic Level

Source

2015-2018

Metropolitan and
Non-Metropolitan
Areas

Occupational
Employment Statistics,
Bureau of Labor
Statistics

County

American Community
Survey, 1-year
estimates, Census
Bureau

County

American Community
Survey, 1-year
estimates, Census
Bureau

County

American Community
Survey, 1-year
estimates, Census
Bureau

Total Population
(Demand-Side)

2015-2017
2018*

Percent Insurance
(Demand-Side)

2015-2017
2018*

Percent NonWhite or Hispanic
(Demand-Side)

2015-2017
2018*

*2018 data to be released in October 2019
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Additional time varying physician level data is not available; however, examples
of time-varying county-level variables from the macro level that might affect a
physicians’ performance are found in Table 4.2. These variables change over time and
might affect CVD quality metrics because they affect the demand and supply of patients
with CVD. They are measured at the county level and vary annually because this is the
smallest geographic level that allows for the most variation over time. Searches of
publicly available data at the county-level did not reveal monthly measures. The
variables found in Table 4.2 were also used in similar studies evaluating the impact of
PCMHs and ACOs on quality. 24,30,36,40
4.11 RESULTS
Table 4.3 present descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (quality
measure) and covariates by year (2016-2018). In Table 4.3, aspirin was being prescribed
to patients within 90 minutes of an AMI diagnosis across the sample on average 33% of
the time (Column 4). Also, AMI showed a slight decrease in performance of this metric
when comparing averages from year to year. The AMI metric dropped from 35% in 2016
to 32% in 2018; while the minimum and maximum held constant at zero and 100%,
respectively (Columns 1-3). The covariates also demonstrated little change in their
averages when comparing them across the individual years. Number of primary care
physicians showed a slight decrease year over year (Columns 1-3); following literature of
this national trend.97,98 Total population slightly increased as well as percent uninsured.
Lastly, percent of the population that is white slightly decreased while percent black had
a sizable increase.
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Characteristics of AMI Quality Metric
Dependent Variable
AMI
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Covariates
Physician
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Total Population
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Percent Uninsured
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
White
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
Black
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

2016
(1)

2017
(2)

2018
(3)

2016-2018
(4)

648
0.353
0.174
0
1

648
0.339
0.201
0
1

648
0.326
0.209
0
1

1,944
0.339
0.196
0
1

1,656
739.13
993.92
90
2,610

1,800
682.60
953.07
50
2,570

1,656
701.09
872.15
100
2,340

1,692
1,692
293,538.20 294,829.10
274,255.70 273,346.30
85,928
85,774
986,410
984,505
1,692
8.289
1.574
6.50
11.0

1,692
9.111
1.579
6.40
12.20

1,692
1,692
235,081.50 235,887.10
184,026.20 181,038.90
77,933
76,775
684,030
674,608
900
66,881.56
96,595.07
10,029
238,612

504
111,368.10
112,396
14,127
241,023
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In Figure 4.2, a scatter plot shows the relationship of the AMI performance metric
over time. This was examined for visible breaks or discontinuity in trend around the time
of the roadshow to see if the CINs formation may have an impact on physician
performance. The AMI metric showed a higher degree of variation because the values of
the observation ranged from 10% to 65%.14

Figure 4.2 Scatter Plot of Dependent Variable CVD Metric Over Time

To further investigate the data graphically, four physicians were selected to
demonstrate what the data looks like at an individual level for the AMI metric. No
obvious breaks in trend were found at this individual level.

14
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In Table 4.4, estimates are presented demonstrating the impact of physicians
becoming participating members of a CIN (MPact) on physicians’ performance in CVD.
I employed three models consisting of different specifications. The first model exploits
the variation in the CVD metrics over time and controls for physician-fixed effects. In
the second model, chapter and time fixed effects are added to the first model’s
specification. In the third model, time-varying county-level controls are added to the
specifications of the second model.
Table 4.4 The Effect of Physicians Becoming Members of a CIN on the AMI Quality
Metric
Dependent
Variable

AMI

"# $%&',),*

Physician
Fixed Effect

-0.019
(0.017)
-0.039
(0.025)
-0.0002
(0.041)

X

Chapter & Time
Fixed Effect

X

X

X

X

Time-Varying
Controls

X

Overall, there were no discernable statistically significant findings for the impact
of physicians becoming participating members of the CIN on physician CVD
performance metrics (aspirin prescribed within 90-minutes of an AMI diagnosis). For the
AMI variable, all three models showed a decrease in prescribing and none were found to
be statistically significant.
4.12 DISCUSSION
Across specifications, there were no meaningful statistically significant findings
of the effect of physicians becoming members of a CIN (MPact) across both CVD quality
metrics. These findings are consistent with previous literature on VBCM quality
outcomes.34,36,39,40,99 There are key explanations for these findings. First, looking at the
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presence of the treatment (the CIN formation through the roadshow) and expecting there
to be a comprehensive impact on physician-level CVD outcome metrics may be too
indirect. Physicians were not required to attend the CIN roadshow presentation by MPact
in person. This lack of required attendance is understandable, as requiring all
cardiothoracic surgeons or cardiologists to leave their work to attend a presentation
would almost certainly result in adverse patient events. Furthermore, while the roadshow
presentation was made available to physicians through internal channels such as human
resources and shared network drives, there is no way to know precisely which physicians
viewed the presentation or the timing of when it was viewed. The lack of effect of the
roadshow on CVD quality metrics is consistent with the face there was no requirement to
either attend the presentation or view the presentation via internal channels.
Furthermore, the variation and low average prescribing patterns shown in the
AMI metric may be attributed to three prevailing factors associated with the measurement
of the actual metric itself. First, many patients presenting with an AMI are already on a
previously established aspirin regimen and therefore should not receive aspirin within the
90-minute window that the AMI metric requires. Second, often times AMI patients
arrive via ambulance where an emergency medical technician (EMT) has administered
aspirin before the attending physician has seen the patient. Therefore, the physician
cannot claim they prescribed the aspirin. Third, physicians do not always consistently
report this metric in the EMR. Most times this is due to aspirin being administered by the
EMT and what transpires in the ambulance is seldom transferred and captured within the
EMR patient encounter. And sometimes, the sheer urgency surrounding an AMI does not
promote careful data capture on the part of the physician.120,121 For these three scenarios,
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there is no room for explanation within the components of the metric itself. For each
patient, measure of the metric is simply a binary yes or no response; the attending
physician cannot justify the medical decision to not prescribe aspirin within 90-minutes
of an AMI and therefore receives the negative count for this quality metric regardless of
the medical necessity.
MPact could benefit from a more rigorous and accurate reporting process. As
mentioned above, physicians may feel the AMI metric is not an accurate depiction of
performance due to inaccurate or incomplete data capture. Furthermore, physicians have
noted this metric may be more impactful if targeted toward emergency medicine
physicians instead of cardiothoracic surgeons and cardiologists. For example, it was
stated many AMI patients who present to the ED never receive a cardiology consult
because the patient is simply not severe enough to need one. Therefore, the emergency
medicine physician presumes responsibility for all diagnoses and action taken during the
AMI encounter without any guidance from a cardiologist. Similarly, if an AMI case is
extremely emergent and serious, the emergency medicine physician has little time to call
for a cardiology consult and instead becomes the aspirin prescriber, not the cardiologist.
In both scenarios, which are common, a cardiologist is not the physician prescribing
aspirin within 90-minutes of an AMI; an emergency medicine physician is. Therefore,
linking cardiologists to this metric is likely to portray an inaccurate result and should
instead tie emergency medicine physicians to the metric as well.
The findings from this chapter suggest that a strategy targeted directly towards
physicians within MPact could more clearly improve readmission metrics. Per the
Donabedian model, the next logical step would be to make the conceptual framework
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tighter by conducting a more impactful structural change targeted toward dissemination
of metrics. Such as strategy would involve dissemination of each individual physicians’
CVD metric outcomes being given directly to each cardiothoracic surgeon and
cardiologist. Furthermore, taking an additional step to unblind these results so physicians
can not only see their own performance but the performance of their peers, would
potentially have an even greater effect on quality. Behavioral economic literature has
shown those physicians who have a true sense of ownership will exhibit the strongest
response to performance-based incentives as they claim any residual affects realized to
the organization along with the stake of their own reputations.101-103 Another possible
targeted strategy could be the implementation of financial incentives tied to each CVD
metric. While MPact’s current incentive is increased market share with risk of being
removed from the network for underperformance, these may not be strong enough to
elucidate an effect. There is a multitude of literature regarding positive physician
response through outcomes and performance through the usage of financial
motivation.14,104-107
These findings should be interpreted within the limitations of the study. First, this
analysis did not compare this CIN to other VBCMs such as ACOs and PCMHs but
instead compared physicians within this one CIN over time. Thus, these findings cannot
make conclusions about quality outcomes in the CIN model versus other models.
Likewise, this study cannot assert findings on any other established CINs. Instead, the
goal was to evaluate physician performance both within individual physicians and across
physicians over time through the use of CVD quality metrics. Second, these CVD
metrics, while evaluated monthly for each physician, are aggregated and reported on for a
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rolling 12-months. MPact’s reasoning for this is twofold. One, by using a rolling 12
months it eliminates small sample sizes on a monthly basis and two, this is the standard
way the data analytics platform reports data. Unfortunately, this method of reporting
thwarts variation whereas using the raw monthly performance per physician maintains
greater variation both within and amongst physicians for a more accurate measure.
Third, although the quality metrics in the database encompass all payers (private, selfinsured, Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare, etc.), I do not know if certain physicians have a
predominant payer mix, which could influence results. This was somewhat adjusted for
using covariates, but this method was imperfect as many physicians could not be matched
to a specific zip code.
4.13 CONCLUSION
This dissertation provides the first early evaluation of the effect that a CIN can
have on the quality of physician performance through outcome metrics. Furthermore,
this study adds to the growing body of knowledge on VBCM’s impact on health care
quality outcomes. Overall, the findings of this chapter suggest little impact on CVD
outcomes after physicians became participating members of the CIN. However, because
the CIN model is one of the newest VBCMs in the health care landscape, it is likely its
impact will increase over time. Therefore, future research should incorporate additional
years of data to evaluate any effects along with any forthcoming strategies MPact adopts
to improve quality outcomes.
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